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Abstract 
 
This paper is an empirical investigation into the duration of exchange rate episodes 
characterized by the absence of speculative attacks.  We estimate a duration model for OECD 
countries during the 1970-1997 period.  Specifically, we use semi-parametric methods to 
estimate model with unrestricted base-line hazards.  The use of duration models allows us to 
account for duration dependence among the determinants of the likelihood of speculative 
attacks.  We can test if the length of the time already spent on the peg is a determinant of the 
probability of exit into a currency crisis state.  The results indicate, first, that increases in 
export growth, bank deposits growth and openness predict a decrease in the probability of 
exit into a currency crises state.  Whereas, increases in import growth; claims on government 
and capital inflows in terms of portfolio investment and appreciated REER, contribute 
positively to the likelihood of an occurrence of a crisis.  And second, the existence of a highly 
significant negative duration dependence.  The highest probability of exit into a currency 
crash state is given at the initial of the peg, decreasing afterwards.  This suggests the 
existence of a political cost of realignment that changes over the duration of the spell; 
growing credibility surrounding an exchange-rate-based stabilization program reduce the 
probability that the peg will be abandoned. 
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Explaining Currency Crises: A Duration
Model Approach
Mara Mercedes Tudela
1 Introduction
The turbulence of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992-93, the
onset of the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian u in 1997 and the Russian
currency markets disturbances in 1998, have renewed the interest in the po-
tential causes of currency crises. An important part of the exchange rate
literature, from both the theoretical and empirical approaches, has concen-
trated on the modeling of exchange rate crises
1
. This paper seek to explain
the origins of currency crises by connecting their occurrence to the realiza-
tions of the explanatory variables. The emphasis is made on the systematic
test of the power of the dierent variables in explaining currency crises, not
in a case study of a specic devaluation episode.
2
We construct for twenty OECD countries for the period 1970-97 a data
set which consists of 68 spells. These spells are dened as those episodes
for which a particular currency does not suer from a speculative attack.
In a broad sense we can talk of a spell as the duration of a specic peg.
From here we dene a tranquil state or episode as a period of time in which
there is no pressure on the currency, while a crisis state is dened as a period
characterized by the presence of a speculative attack, either successful or not.
We use duration analysis to study the countries' probability to leave a tran-
quil state exiting into a currency crisis state. The use of duration models is
1
We use the terms of currency crises, speculative attack and exchange rate crises in-
terchangeably.
2
Examples of this type of studies are Blanco and Garber (1986), Jeanne and Masson
(1997) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996).
1
an innovative strategy for estimating the probabilities of exiting a currency
peg.
3
This method allows us not only the study of the determinants of the
likelihood of a currency crash, but also the duration of the spells of tranquil-
lity. That is, how much time countries stay in a tranquil period, how much
this varies over the business cycle and how the duration of tranquil states
varies across countries.
4
We are looking for the determinants of the length
of time a currency spends in a tranquil state. We consider that both the
incidence of speculative attacks and the duration of the spells of tranquillity,
are important in assessing currency stability. Exchange rate credibility can-
not only depend on the event of a speculative attack, but also on the time
already spent in a tranquil episode.
A duration model approach is important for our problem given the existence
of non-stationarities in the real world. The characteristics of the nancial
markets change over time, so the probabilities of exit into a turbulent state
change as well with the length of the spell. We want to capture those non-
stationarities.
Including time-dependent explanatory variables in an empirical model of cur-
rency crises helps to incorporate those non-stationarities, but these models
miss duration dependence as a second kind of non-stationarity. With this
last feature we want to test the length of time already spent on the spell as
a determinant of the likelihood of exit into a turbulent episode. We want
to test if the likelihood of a devaluation is higher for tranquil periods, say,
in the rst quarters, than for periods that have lasted longer, after control-
ling for other time-varying factors. We can argue that the political costs of
realignment change over the duration of the spell, maybe due to changes in
the credibility of the peg. Growing credibility, surrounding an exchange-rate-
based stabilization program, might reduce the probability that the peg will
be abandoned. In short, we want to understand the role played by the time
spent on the peg in determining the likelihood of exit into a currency crash.
Most of the empirical studies undertaken so far to estimate the probabili-
ties of occurrence of speculative attacks are of the probit and logit nature.
3
We use the expression currency peg understood as an episode of currency stability.
4
These are the classical questions that Kiefer (1988) raised in his seminal paper on
duration applied to unemployment data.
2
Therefore they miss the feature of time dependence implicitly given in any
currency event.
Klein and Marion (1994) suggest that even if some of the determinants for
the duration of a xed exchange-rate spell may remain constant over a spell,
others will change. A simple correlation of the length of each spell with
some constant measure of each explanatory variable (e.g. the value of the
variable at the beginning or at the end of a spell or its change over the spell
or its average value during the spell) fails to capture important information
about the time path of the variable during the spell. Therefore, they claim
for an empirical approach that allows to consider time-varying determinants,
rejecting explicitly the use of ordinary least squares or duration analysis.
They use logit models instead.
5
Nevertheless, we propose more sophisticated
duration models: duration models with the added feature of time-varying
variables, so we do not miss the explanatory power of time-varying determi-
nants and, moreover, we incorporate duration dependence as a second class
of non-stationarity within spells.
Kumar, Moorthy and Perraudin (1998) use a logit model as well to estimate
the likelihood that a country with given economic and nancial characteris-
tics, operating in a particular global environment, will have a devaluation.
6
Their main concern is to develop a framework to forecast currency crises that
could be useful for investors and policy makers involved in emerging markets.
That is the reason to employ relatively high frequency data.
The work by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996) is a clear example of a
systematic process of testing the predictions of theories that highlight motives
for, and dynamics of, speculative attacks. They analyze a panel of quarterly
macroeconomic and political data, covering twenty industrial countries from
1959 through 1993. They estimate a binary probit model linking their de-
pendent variable (an indicator variable which takes on a value of unity for
a speculative attack and zero otherwise) to their controls using maximum
likelihood.
5
The model is estimated for sixteen Latin American countries and Jamaica during the
1957-91 period.
6
This empirical analysis is based on monthly pooled time-series cross-section data for
32 emerging markets from January 1985 to March 1998.
3
Keeping the probabilistic approach of the above studies we estimate the
probabilities of speculative attacks as realizations of a stochastic point pro-
cess. But under the framework of duration or survival analysis, our interest
centers on the process of movement from state (tranquil period) to state
(crises period) generating a sequence of points on the time axis - the times
at which transitions are made.
Each jump of the point process is the occurrence of a shock that implies
the transition from a tranquil state into a crisis state. The failure time will
be the length of the tranquil state.
A dierent approach is used in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) who
examine the empirical evidence on currency crises and propose a specic early
warning system. This system involves monitoring the evolution of several in-
dicators that tend to exhibit an unusual behavior in the periods preceding
a crisis. When an indicator exceeds a certain threshold value, this is inter-
preted as a warning signal that a currency crisis may take place within the
following 24 months.
Other empirical studies concentrate only on a qualitative discussion of the
causes of currency crises, stressing the evolution of one or more indicators.
See for example, Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), Goldstein (1996),
Krugman (1996) or Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998).
Studying the dierent behavior of some key variables between the periods
leading up to, and immediately following, currency crises is the aim of works
by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and Moreno (1995).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 concentrates
on the methodological issues. Section 3 depicts the measure of speculative
pressure used to analyze the empirics of speculative attacks. The data are
described in Section 4. In Section 5 we present our main results. Section 6
concludes.
4
2 Methodological Issues
We analyze the process of transition from a tranquil state to a crisis state.
We dene a tranquil state as a period of time in which there is no pressure
on the currency. A crisis state is dened as a period characterized by the
presence of a speculative attack, whether successful or not. This process gen-
erates a sequence of points on the time axis: the times at which speculative
attacks occur and, therefore, the transitions are made. These movements are
random, so the evolution of the state of a country over time is a realization
of a stochastic point process.
Following Eichengreen et al. (1996) we do not identify currency crises with ac-
tual devaluations, revaluations and instances in which the currency is oated.
The reason is twofold. First, not all speculative attacks are successful. The
currency may be supported by the intervention of the national central bank
via expenditure of reserves, or by foreign central banks and governments or,
even, by the threat or actual imposition of capital controls. The use of in-
terest rates and austerity policies are other alternatives to repel an attack.
Second, realignments are undertaken in tranquil periods in order to preclude
future attacks.
Since the monetary authority can accommodate the exchange market pres-
sure by running down its international reserves or by raising interest rates,
a measure of speculative attacks has to reect those possibilities. For that
reason, we adopt a measure of exchange market pressure inspired by the one
suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1996).
7
For the specication of our duration model
8
we use Cox (1972) approach
of proportional hazards. With this specication, it is possible to estimate
the unknown parameters without specifying the form of the base-line haz-
ard,
9
thus providing a partially non-parametric estimator for those constants.
The proportional hazard models seem a reasonable compromise between the
Kaplan-Meier estimate (a non-parametric approach) and the possibly exces-
7
The concrete specication of this measure is presented in the next section.
8
See Kiefer (1988) and Lancaster (1990) for a discussion of these models. See as well
Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) as an application of this kind of models.
9
That is, the part of the hazard (the conditional probability) that is common for all
individuals in a proportional hazard model.
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sively structured parametric models-given the absence of a theory we can
follow in determining the specication of the hazard function.
10
The proportional hazard specication in continuous time leads to a hazard
function of the form:
 (t; x (t) ; ; 
0
) =  (x (t) ; )
0
(t) (1)
where x (t) denotes time dependent variables,  is a vector of unknown coef-
cients and 
0
(t) is the base-line hazard corresponding to  (:) = 1. The rst
component of (1),  (:), describes the way in which  shifts between individ-
uals endowed with dierent x
0
s at given duration t. The second component,
the base-line hazard, is a functional form for the dependence of  on duration.
A commonly used specication of  is:
 (x (t) ; ) = exp
 
x (t)
0


(2)
This specication is convenient because non-negativity of  does not impose
restrictions on . Moreover, the vector of coeÆcients can be interpreted as
the constant proportional eect of x on the conditional probability of ending
the spell. This is the analog, in a hazard setting, of the usual partial deriva-
tive interpretation of a linear regression coeÆcient.
In a discrete specication, the hazard function denotes the probability of
moving to a crisis state in period t+1 conditional on being in tranquil state
until period t. After some calculations we can write the hazard function as:
h
i
(t) = 1  exp

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 
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0


+  (t)
	
(3)
We have to express these probabilities in terms of a likelihood function to be
estimated.
The contribution to log likelihood made by the i
th
observation, which fails
or is censored in the t
j
interval is:
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The hazard function is a conditional probability, the probability of moving into a crises
state in period t+t conditional on being in a tranquil state until period t.
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where d
i
= 1 if the i
th
spell is uncensored and, d
i
= 0 if censored.
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There still remains one more consideration about the correct likelihood func-
tion. Our data consist of N countries each of which can experience multiple
transitions. This is what is called multiple-cycle data. In that case, the
hazard functions may depend upon the number of previous entries to the
tranquil state, which is known as occurrence dependence. Or it may depend
upon the lengths of previous visits to the tranquil state, which is known as
lagged duration dependence. In order to write the concrete log likelihood
function for a given country let us dene:
d
c
=

1 if crisis state is entered at the end of the c
th
cycle
0 otherwise

we summarize the transition intensities, h
c
(t; s), as the hazard function for
the c
th
cycle at calendar time t and elapsed duration s. Then, for a country
which we observe over C
i
cycles, the last of which may be right censored, the
log likelihood contribution will be:
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where h (:) is given by (3).
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A spell is censored when the spell is not completed: when we do not observe the whole
duration of the spell until the transition to the turbulent state is made.
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3 Measuring Exchange Market Pressure
The rst issue in any empirical analysis of currency crises is to dene spec-
ulative attacks. We do not want to limit ourselves to successful speculative
attacks, that is, to the cases in which the exchange rate regime was altered
(and the currency was either defaulted or oated). Studies of this type are
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998) and Frankel and Rose (1996). They dene
currency crises based only on unusual movements of the exchange rates.
We want to capture as well those unsuccessful attacks that have been warded
o by central banks and governments. The monetary authorities may ac-
commodate the pressure on the nancial markets by running down their
international reserves or deter the attack by raising interest rates. In these
circumstances, currency market pressures will be translated into steep in-
creases in domestic interest rates and/or great losses of foreign exchange
reserves. Therefore, a measure of speculative attacks should capture these
three dierent forms of currency market turbulences.
In this line Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) construct a measure of
speculative pressure by means of an index. This index is a weighted average
of exchange rate changes, changes in reserves, and interest rate changes. The
index of exchange market pressures is dened as:
EMP
i;t
= e
i;t
+ (i
i;t
  i

t
)   (r
i;t
 r

t
) (7)
where ;  and  are the chosen weights, e
i;t
is the change in the exchange
rate, i
i;t
denotes the domestic interest rate, i

t
corresponds to the same vari-
able but for the country of reference, r
i;t
is the ratio of foreign reserves to
domestic money for the domestic country and, r

t
denotes the same concept
for the country of reference.
This is a common measure used in several studies by the same authors
(Eichengreen et al. (1996), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1997) and by
Sachs et al. (1996) and Kaminsky et al. (1998), with variations in the weights
given to the three components of the index.
Dening the EMP index of equation 7 as an unweighted measure has the
obvious advantage of the simplicity. The disadvantage is that the volatility
8
of exchange rates, interests rates and reserves are very dierent.
12
Eichen-
green et al. (1994), Eichengreen et al. (1996), Eichengreen et al. (1997) and
Kaminsky et al. (1998) work with the EMP index weighting the three com-
ponents so as to equalize their volatilities. In this way they prevent any of
the components from dominating the index.
The next step is the identication of a currency crisis using the EMP indi-
cator. Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz identify quarters in which their index
is at least one and a half standard deviations above the sample mean as
instances of speculative attacks. To avoid counting of the same crisis more
than once, they exclude the later observation when two (or more) crises occur
in successive quarters.
We believe that this way of dening a currency crisis is faulty. First, the
unweighted EMP index is defective because it obviates the inherent dier-
ent volatility of its three components. Second, the weighted EMP measure
(according to the particular volatilities of its components) is inadequate be-
cause it cannot capture those episodes in which the monetary authorities
were very successful in controlling a speculative attack but, however, ended
with an important loss of reserves.
For these reasons we construct a third measure of speculative pressure. We
use the same three indicators (exchange rate changes, changes in reserves,
and interest rate changes,
13
but in a rather dierent way. Episodes where
changes in the exchange rate are superior to +1.5 standard deviations over
the means are selected rst as episodes of speculative attacks. From the
remaining episodes we look at the reserves indicator. If changes in relative
foreign reserves are below the -1.5 standard deviation band, we describe them
as turbulent episodes. As new episodes of currency crisis we add those ones
for which the interest rate dierential is above the +1.5 standard deviation
band.
12
The volatility of the percentage changes in the reserves (scaled by the monetary base)
is several times the conditional volatility of the percentage change in the exchange rate,
which is several times the percentage in the interest dierential.
13
These variables are measured in relative terms with those prevailing either in Germany
or in USA, depending on the country of interest. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and
Japan are related to the US$.
9
The rest of observations are classied as periods of tranquillity. Some re-
marks are in order here. First, whenever we nd that only one of the three
variables lies outside the band, we look at the deviation from the band and
the behavior of the two other variables. If the case is such that the deviation
from the band is just marginal and the two other variables have a normal
behavior, we disqualify that episode as a turbulent one, it is classied as
tranquil. If, on the contrary, we observe that the three variables are in the
margin of the band, we qualify the episode as turbulent. In order to pre-
vent the continuation of a speculative episode from being identied as a new
episode, we exclude the later observation(s) when two or more crises occur
in successive quarters.
In Table A of the Appendix we report the identied turbulent episodes by the
three measures. Tables B and C (see Appendix) report the oÆcial currency
events and the identication of a turbulent period and the associated oÆcial
event when applicable. In that way we can check for the appropriateness of
our measure of speculative pressure when the attacks were successful, and
the location of the unsuccessful speculative attacks.
From these tables we can conclude the superiority of our third measure over
the other two. The rst index, the unweighted EMP , identies too few
crises according to the oÆcial events. The second measure, the weighted
EMP (weighted in order to equalize the volatility of its three components)
misses, mainly, unsuccessful speculative attacks that were faced by unusual
movements in foreign reserves. A clear example is Denmark in 1992 and 1993
at the time of the tensions in the EMS. In late 1992, Denmark warded o the
attacks by a huge loss in foreign reserves. This is what we call unsuccessful
speculative attack and should be included in our study. An EMP index of
the type of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz would miss these crises since
relative foreign reserves have the largest volatility (of the three components)
and given that they weight the three indicators in order to equalize their
volatilities, foreign reserves lose quite a lot of their importance, failing to
capture this kind of crisis.
Another example along the same line is France in 1992. Using an index
of the type proposed by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, we do not identify
as a speculative attack episode the events of 1992 for France. Whereas, if we
use our proposed measure, we do classify the episode as a speculative attack,
10
given the huge loss in reserves that took place at that moment in order to
prevent the crisis.
To shed some light on the characteristics of speculative pressure episodes
we report the proportion of times that a change in either the exchange rate,
relative foreign reserves or relative short term rates is the criterion that quali-
es an episode as a period of speculative pressure. A total of 62% of turbulent
episodes is explained by unusual behavior in the real exchange rate. Rela-
tive reserves identify 29% of the crises, and the rest, 9%, is due to extreme
movements of the short-term interest rate.
Since episodes that are classied as turbulent ones due to unusual movements
in either relative reserves or relative interest rates are not accompanied by
large adjustments in exchange rates (according to our measure of speculative
attacks), we can say that monetary authorities have intervened actively in
foreign exchange markets, using reserves and interest rates, to face specula-
tive pressures 38% of the time. That is, monetary authorities have succeed
in those occasions to prevent the large movements of the exchange rate. This
is what we called unsuccessful speculative attacks.
In Figure 1 we report the distribution of the currency crises along the time
axis and Table 1 shows the number of crises identied by countries. Den-
mark, France, Sweden and UK are the countries with the greatest number
of speculative attacks. At the other extreme, Canada, Portugal, the Nether-
lands and Australia have the smallest number of currency crises.
Before explaining the results of our estimates, we have to report some of
the characteristics of the duration of the spells. Remember that a spell is
dened as the time that a particular currency does not suer from a specu-
lative attack, so we can talk about the duration of a specic peg in a broad
sense.
Information about the duration of the pegs is provided in Table 2. Due to
the lack of data, the original number of crises detected by our measure, 149,
falls to 68 (81 spells if we consider unnished durations) when we introduce
the macro variables in our analysis (see Table 3).
It is assumed that one spell ends when the country leaves that state (tranquil
11
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Table 1: Number of Crises by Country
Country Number of Crises
1
Denmark 16
France 15
Sweden 14
UK 14
Belgium 13
USA 13
Austria 11
Ireland 11
Italy 11
Norway 11
Finland 10
New Zealand 9
Switzerland 9
Greece 9
Japan 9
Spain 9
Australia 8
The Netherlands 7
Portugal 7
Canada 5
mean 10.6
standard deviation 2.9
1
Number of total crises, we do not have
excluded consecutive crises yet.
13
state) to enter another one (here a currency crises state), otherwise the spell
is right censored. In econometric duration models right censoring is usually
modelled by a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if an exit is observed
and 0 otherwise.
From Tables 2, 3, and Figure 2, we see that the exit rate into a turbulent
episode is higher in the early quarters of the peg. One third of the spells in our
sample end, or are right censored in the rst year of the peg, and half of them
end or are right censored within two years and a half. In addition, 64% of
the durations are below four years in length. According to these proportions
and given the limited number of crises, we concentrate our estimates in the
behavior of the base-line hazard (that is, of the duration parameters) in the
four years since the beginning of the peg. This argument is reinforced for
the completed spells, with 70% of the population ending spells in four years
time.
4 The Data
We have assembled quarterly data from 1970 through 1997 for twenty OECD
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
The data base is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by
the International Monetary Fund and Main Economic Indicators by OECD.
To dene the indices of speculative pressure, we use data from the IFS.
Here e
i;t
denotes the exchange rate in terms of national currency over DM or
US$ of country i at time t. We use market rates, that is the exchange rate
determined largely by market forces and dened as period averages.
The discount rate, preferably, or the money market rate, depending on the
availability of data, is the measure of the interest rate entering the denition
of the EMP index as i
i;t
.
International reserves, r
i;t
, are constructed as the ratio of reserves to nar-
row money (M1). The reserves measure excludes gold.
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Table 2: Distribution of Total Tranquil Spells
N Frequency Percent Cum.
1 7 8.64 08.64
2 8 9.88 18.52
3 6 7.41 25.93
4 6 7.41 33.33
5 4 4.94 38.27
6 1 1.23 39.51
7 2 2.47 41.98
8 2 2.47 44.44
9 2 2.47 46.91
10 3 3.70 50.62
11 1 1.23 51.85
13 3 3.70 55.56
15 1 1.23 56.79
16 6 7.41 64.20
18 1 1.23 65.43
19 4 4.94 70.37
20 4 4.94 75.31
21 4 4.94 80.25
22 2 2.47 82.72
23 2 2.47 85.19
33 1 1.23 86.42
35 2 2.47 88.89
36 1 1.23 90.12
37 1 1.23 91.36
38 2 2.47 93.83
40 2 2.47 96.30
47 2 2.47 98.77
54 1 1.23 100
Total 81
Mean 14
Median 17
Standard Deviation 13
Range [1,54]
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Table 3: Distribution of Completed Tranquil Spells
N Frequency Percent Cum.
1 7 10.29 10.29
2 8 11.76 22.06
3 6 8.82 30.88
4 6 8.82 39.71
5 4 5.88 45.59
6 1 1.47 47.06
7 2 2.94 50.00
8 2 2.94 52.94
9 1 1.47 54.41
10 3 4.41 58.82
11 1 1.47 60.29
13 3 4.41 64.71
15 1 1.47 66.18
16 2 2.94 69.12
19 3 4.41 73.53
21 4 5.88 79.41
22 2 2.94 82.35
23 2 2.94 85.29
35 2 2.94 88.24
36 1 1.47 89.71
37 1 1.47 91.18
38 2 2.94 94.12
40 2 2.94 97.06
47 1 1.47 98.53
54 1 1.47 100
Total 68
Mean 13
Standard Deviation 13
16
We have chosen the following variables to serve as determinants of the like-
lihood of a speculative attack: real GDP at 1990 prices, we introduce this
macroeconomic fundamental in terms of growth rates; Consumer Price Index
(CPI), base year 1990, to construct the ination indicator; unemployment,
in terms of its growth rate; merchandise exports, f.o.b. and merchandise
imports, c.i.f., both in terms of growth rates and dened over GDP, plus an
indicator of the degree of openness of the country, constructed as exports plus
imports over GDP; the real eective exchange rate index (REER), dened as
a nominal eective exchange rate index adjusted for relative movements in a
national cost indicator of relative normalized unit labor costs in manufactur-
ing. The nominal eective exchange rate is an index of the period average
exchange rate of the currency in question to a weighted geometric average
of exchange rates for the currencies of selected countries. The weights are
derived from trade in manufactured goods among industrial countries over
the period 1989-91. As an indicator of the domestic monetary condition we
include domestic deposits: demand deposits plus time and saving deposits.
We consider again this variable deated by GDP and in terms of rate of
growth. Domestic credit, claims on government, and claims on private sector
are our indicators of a possible credit expansion. To take into consideration
the debate concerning capital account liberalization and the extent to which
measures to increase transaction costs may alter the composition of ows,
and reduce the vulnerability resulting from sudden outows -we include in
our analysis, portfolio ows and foreign direct investment (FDI).
We have to keep in mind that quarterly observations may not be a good
periodicity to identify every speculative attack, especially unsuccessful ones.
Pressure against pegged currencies can occur and be repelled quickly through
a rise in interest rate or foreign-exchange-market intervention within the
quarter. When an attack occurs and is repelled with immediate action, the
average behavior of both interest rates and international reserves over the
quarter are not, probably, going to reect the intensity of speculative pres-
sures. But the availability of data restricts us to quarterly observations in
order to capture the maximum spectrum of countries in a long time period.
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5 Results
The results are reported in Table 4. The dependent variable is the proba-
bility of leaving a tranquil state. The estimates for the parameters of the
model are shown in the second column with their standard errors in the third
column. The expected sign for the coeÆcients of the explanatory variables
are reported in the last column.
The use of a proportional hazard model allows for an easy interpretation
of the estimated parameters. If the sign is positive, the eect on the hazard
rate will be positive (shorter durations). If it is negative, the eect will be
negative (larger durations).
The baseline rate has been dened through a set of dummy variables, one
for each quarter till the fth. From the sixth to the eleventh it has been
dened with a dummy for every two quarters. One more dummy is intro-
duced for the next ve quarters. From then on, we do not include any more
dummies, since we only estimate the base-line hazard for the four rst years
for the reasons stated previously. The main feature of this kind of function
(also known as piecewise constant hazard rate) is that it is constant in each
interval, but may vary from one interval to the other. The rst interval is
used as the reference level.
5.1 Time-Varying Variables
Variables from quarter t are used to determine the probability of exit in quar-
ter t + 1 in order to avoid feedback eects of the occurrence of a currency
crash into the macroeconomic variables.
14
Consider the rst variable, GDP growth. The negative sign of the estimated
parameter indicates that a decline in GDP growth leads to an increase in
the probability of ending the spell of tranquility. That is, a weakening in
economic activity is likely to be associated with an increase in the vulnera-
bility of the currency to attacks. The underlying explanation of this result
is the following: an increasing rate of growth may generate buoyancy in the
14
See Agenor, Bhandari and Flood (1992), Flood and Garber (1984), Garber and Sven-
soon (1994), Krugman (1979) and Wyplosz (1986) for a revision of the theoretical models
on currency crises.
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Estimates Std. error Expected sign
Steps
q1 -2.28

0.50
q2 -1.19

0.47
q3 -2.09

0.38
q4 -2.00

0.50
q5 -2.37

0.56
q6-q7 -3.39

0.60
q8-q9 -3.38

0.64
q10-q11 -2.81

0.43
q12-q16 -2.66

0.45
Independent Variables
Growth -0.06 0.09 -
Ination 0.08 0.09 +
Unemployment 0.01 0.02 +
Export Growth -0.04

0.02 -
Import Growth 0.03

0.02 +
Openness -0.01

0.01 -
REER (deviation from trend) -0.08

0.03 -
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05

0.03 -
Claims on Government/GDP 0.01

0.01 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.06

0.03 +
FDI/GDP -0.01 0.11 -
*
,
**
and
***
indicate signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectevely.
Note: the inclusion of a dummy variable to account for lagged duration dependence
turns out to be not signicant, so we excluded it from our analysis.
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domestic asset markets, attracting capital inows and, therefore, supporting
the currency. Conversely, if growth is declining there would be pressures to
ease nancial policies, among them currency depreciation, to stimulate ac-
tivity. Notwithstanding, our coeÆcient is not signicant.
Our second variable, ination, has the expected sign that, albeit again, is
not signicant: high ination increases the likelihood of exit into a turbulent
period. Kumar et al. (1998) argue that high ination can increase vulner-
ability to crises through an impact on resource allocation, competitiveness,
and macroeconomic stability. In an exchange rate peg (or relatively inexible
nominal exchange rate regime) a higher level of ination than that of partner
countries can lead to signicant overvaluation in the real exchange rate.
A possible justication of the non-signicance of the ination variables lie in
the inclusion of the REER variable. When we do not include REER, ination
is signicant. In previous works, ination is signicant either when REER
is excluded, as in Eichengreen et al. (1996), or when an ination indicator
is introduced by means of a dummy variable that reects only high ination
regimes rather than absolute values, as in Kumar et al. (1998).
As we expected, high unemployment increases the vulnerability to crises.
The slump in economic activity, reected in a rise of unemployment, makes
the Central Banks more attentive to domestic objectives, compromising the
exchange rate target. But once again, our coeÆcient is not signicant. We
have included this variable in the nal specication in rates of growth to
take into account the historical dierent levels of unemployment rates in the
countries under study. The inclusion of the variable in levels changes neither
its sign, its signicance feature, nor the behavior of the other variables.
As variables that reect the health of the foreign sector we have included:
exports, imports and an indicator of openness.
The export variable is included in relative terms to GDP and in rate of
growth. The dierent studies on currency crises emphasize the role of a
sharp slowdown in export growth as a key contributor to currency vulnera-
bility. A slowdown in exports is likely to increase the probability of a crisis.
Our study conrms this result: the sign for the coeÆcient of the export vari-
able is negative and signicant. A result consistent with Kumar et al. (1998).
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According to our estimates, import growth increases in the advance of a
speculative attack, reected by the positive sign and signicant coeÆcient.
Therefore, an increase in import growth helps to predict the probability of
the occurrence of a currency crisis event.
Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998) argue that more open economies are less
likely to suer an exchange rate crash. The benets of trade openness out-
weighs the higher vulnerability to external shocks. Openness reects how
connected the economy is to the rest of the world and stands here for trade
liberalization. It is proxied by exports plus imports over GDP. We obtain a
negative and signicant expected sign, in line with Milesi-Ferreti and Razin's
argument, and with the results of Kumar et al. (1998), but unable to nd in
Eichengreen et al. (1996).
The behavior of the latter three variables can be better understood if we
consider the eects of the REER. The REER is found to be one of the most
important indicators in assessing likely pressures against a currency (Kamin-
sky et al. (1998). We can consider the REER as a possible proxy for loss of
international price competitiveness and exchange rate misalignment.
Following Kumar et al. (1998), REER can act as a channel for the con-
tagion eect via a competitiveness eect: when one currency is devalued, the
trading partners' position deteriorates vis a vis that economy. This would
show up in the trade accounts with some lag, but investors act on the ex-
pectation of the impact and increases in the pressure on the other currencies
may follow immediately. A higher value of the exchange rate index implies
a more appreciated domestic real exchange rate. Therefore, we expect the
coeÆcient on the real eective exchange rate index to be positive.
On the other hand, an appreciation of the real exchange rate relative to
its historical value increases the degree of misalignment. Trend measures of
the REER (based on the Hodrick Prescott lter) can provide an approximate
measure of signicant disequilibrium in the real exchange rate. We introduce
the variable REER as deviations from this trend therefore, expecting a neg-
ative sign.
According to Table 4, the deviation of the REER from its trend variable
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is signicant and has the correct sign. Table D (see Appendix) includes
REER instead of its deviations from trend. Again, the sign is as expected
and the coeÆcient is signicant. Including REER or its deviation from trend
has no eect either on the rest of the variables or in the shape of the base-
line hazard function. Therefore, with both REER and deviations of REER
from its historical trend, we support the hypothesis of REER as, rst, a com-
petitiveness indicator, with deteriorations of that indicator leading to higher
probabilities of speculative attacks, and, second, as a measure of exchange
rate misalignment: appreciations beyond its natural trend result in stronger
likelihood of exit into a turbulent episode.
As a breaking point with the aforementioned works we introduce deposits
over GDP (in terms of their growth rate) that serve as a proxy for the exis-
tence of deposit runs and loss of condence in the banking system, or of the
shrinkage of banks' balance sheets for other reasons. Our results show that
the coeÆcient for this variable has the expected sign and is signicant. The
absence of falling deposits is reected in a lower probability of a currency
crisis event therefore, reecting the inuence of the banking sector over the
likelihood of a currency crisis.
In order to capture Krugman's eect
15
(domestic credit expansion) on the
likelihood of a speculative attack, past empirical studies include the domestic
credit variable. This variable is a mix of claims on central government, local
governments, nonnancial public enterprises, private sector, other banking
institutions and nonbank nancial institutions. But what Krugman empha-
sizes is not the behavior of all those components of the total domestic credit,
but the credit to the government; the credit expansion due to the moneti-
zation of the government budget decit. In order to capture the eect of
this variable on the likelihood of a speculative attack, we should take into
consideration only the claims on government (in net terms) by the central
bank and other banks. We have not seen any study that makes such a con-
sideration. We then include claims on government as one of our time-varying
independent variables. Our results show the signicance of this variable and
indicate a higher probability of exit into a turbulent episode due to an in-
crease of claims on government (relative to GDP).
15
See Krugman (1979).
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In order to check the accuracy of our proposition, we have also estimated
the model using domestic credit instead of claims on government. The result
is shown in Table E (see Appendix): domestic credit has the wrong sign and
it is not signicant.
To double check, we have also estimated the model including both claims on
government and claims on private sector. The rst remains signicant and
with the correct sign, but the latter is not signicant. Moreover, Eichengreen
et al. (1996) introduce credit growth and fail to nd a signicant inuence of
this variable on the likelihood of occurrence of a currency crisis. Therefore,
we conclude that claims on government is the variable that better reects
Krugman's eect.
The last two variables included in our regression analysis reect the com-
position of capital inows: portfolio investment and FDI, both variables
deated by domestic GDP. As Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kumar et al.
(1998) argue, the hypothesis is that FDI is a safer way to nance invest-
ment than is portfolio investment. First, FDI is said to be directly tied to
real investment in plants, equipment and infrastructure; whereas the other
type of investment goes to consumption and, therefore, does not help to add
productive capacity to the system, which is necessary to generate exports
that go into the service of debt in the future. Second, the dierence between
these two types of capital inows may be an important factor in determining
the vulnerability of a country to its capital inows. Portfolio ows are very
sensitive to any changes in the international nancial environment as well
as to changes in investor sentiment. In the event of a crash, investors can
suddenly dump portfolio investments, but multinational corporations cannot
quickly sell their factories, that is, dump FDI.
Regarding portfolio investment, this variable is highly signicant and has
the expected sign: increases in portfolio investment raise the probability of
occurrence of a currency crisis. Nonetheless, the FDI variable, even if it has
the expected sign is not signicant. We can only compare these results with
the ones of Kumar et al. (1998), since Eichengreen et al. (1996) do not con-
sider the eects of these kind of variables. Kumar et al. (1998) obtain the
same eect regarding portfolio investment variable, a positive and signicant
eect. Nevertheless, they nd a signicant eect but negative, meaning that
increases in FDI revert in higher likelihood of a crisis. The reason is prob-
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ably due to the dierent group of countries under study: emerging markets
in their work, OECD countries in our paper.
Summarizing and comparing with Eichengreen et al. (1996) (that is the clos-
est paper to ours, both in terms of country sample and on the construction
of the dependent variable based on a EMP index), we nd a wide range
of signicant variables, in contrast of Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz's two
macroeconomic signicant variables (unemployment rate and ination) plus
the contagion variable. Therefore, our study allows a better understanding
of the causes of currency crises.
Moreover, it still remains the interpretation of the second part of the output
of our estimates, the base-line hazard and the corresponding hypothesis of
duration dependence of exchange rate episodes of tranquility. We examine
these considerations in the next section.
5.2 Estimated Base-Line Hazard
The scaled estimated base-line hazard for our semiparametric function model
is plotted in Figure 3. With the base-line hazard we want to test whether
time spent on the peg has an independent eect on the likelihood of a cur-
rency crisis event, that is, our hypothesis of a duration dependence beyond
the control of time-varying variables.
The base-line hazard function shows a downward slope from the second quar-
ter after the start of the peg. That is, the likelihood of exit into a currency
crisis state declines with the length of the peg. Therefore, we can clearly state
a negative duration dependence: the probability of leaving the peg decreases
with duration. Our hypothesis on the existence of duration dependence, even
after controlling for time-varying factors, is conrmed, and hence, the use of
duration analysis to model the likelihood of currency crises is the optimal.
More specically, in the rst quarter, the probability of a speculative at-
tack is lower than in the following one. That probability increases in the
second quarter and remains around that level for the rst year of the peg.
These two facts seem to show that at the very beginning of the peg the agents
are not very condent in the peg. After the rst quarter, the agents test the
exchange rate regime resulting in a higher likelihood of breaking the peg in
24
Figure 3: Estimated Base-line Hazard
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that quarter. After the rst year, the probability of exit into a currency crisis
state declines sharply, stabilizing by the end of the second year of the peg,
to recover a little bit in the initial months of the third year and turning into
a at line afterwards. Concluding, this general downward slope of the curve
indicates that agents get more condent as the peg goes on. This may sug-
gest that a policy-maker gains credibility over time while on a peg, changing
the political cost of realignment over the duration of the spell.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have adopted a duration model towards the determination
of the origins of a currency crisis event. We concentrate on the likelihood of
a crisis for a country in a given period related to some explanatory variables.
We dier, then, from the traditional empirical studies on currency crashes
that adopt probit or logit models in their specications. The use of duration
models allows us to account for duration dependence among the determi-
nants of the likelihood of speculative attacks, without neglecting the use of
time-varying explanatory variables as used by other researchers. One of the
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main objectives of this paper is to test for time dependence, that is, the
length of the time already spent on the peg as determinant of the probability
of exit into a crisis state.
From our estimates, we rst state the inuence of some macro variables on
the likelihood of exit into a turbulent state. Increases in the rate of growth
of exports, decreases in the rate of growth of imports, and openness are
associated with a decrease in the vulnerability of the currency to attacks.
Appreciated REER is highly signicant in predicting increases in the occur-
rence of a currency crisis, the same as increases in capital inows in the form
of portfolio investment. Claims on government help to predict the likelihood
of a speculative attack, increases in that credit position raise the likelihood of
exit into a turbulent state; whereas increases in the rate of growth of deposits
over GDP decrease the probability of a crisis event.
Regarding the duration dependence which characterizes our data, the maxi-
mum probabilities of exit are given at the start of the peg (tranquil period),
but with a clear tendency to decrease after the rst year of the peg. That is,
we can clearly state a negative and highly signicant duration dependence.
This fact may suggest the existence of a political cost of realignment that
changes over the duration of the spell: growing credibility surrounding an
exchange-rate-based stabilization program might reduce the probability that
the peg will be abandoned.
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A Appendix
Table A: Identication of Currency Crises
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Australia
1974:3 yes yes
1974:4 yes yes
1979:1 yes yes
1981:3 yes yes
1985:1 yes yes
1985:2 yes yes
1986:3 yes yes
1989:2 yes
Austria
1970:1 yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes
1971:1 yes yes
1971:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1978:4 yes yes
1981:1 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Belgium
1970:1 yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1976:1 yes yes
1979:3 yes yes
1981:1 yes yes
1981:4 yes
1982:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:2 yes
1993:3 yes yes yes
Canada
1977:1 yes yes
1977:4 yes
1978:4 yes
1980:1 yes
1981:2 yes yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1984:2 yes
1992:1 yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
1994:2 yes
1995:1 yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Denmark
1970:1 yes
1970:2 yes yes
1971:2 yes yes yes
1971:3 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:3 yes yes
1977:2 yes yes
1977:3 yes yes
1977:4 yes yes yes
1979:4 yes yes
1980:1 yes yes
1982:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1993:3 yes
1995:1 yes yes
Finland
1970:1 yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1975:1 yes
1977:2 yes yes
1982:4 yes
1991:4 yes yes
1992:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
1993:1 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
France
1971:3 yes
1973:3 yes yes
1973:4 yes
1974:1 yes yes yes
1974:2 yes yes
1976:1 yes
1976:2 yes yes
1976:3 yes yes
1976:4 yes yes
1978:1 yes yes
1978:4 yes yes
1981:4 yes yes
1982:3 yes yes
1983:2 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
Greece
1971:3 yes yes yes
1973:2 yes yes yes
1973:3 yes
1973:4 yes
1974:3 yes
1980:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes yes yes
1983:1 yes yes
1985:4 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Ireland
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes
1972:2 yes yes
1972:3 yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:2 yes
1976:4 yes yes
1986:3 yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
Italy
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes
1973:3 yes
1974:2 yes
1974:4 yes yes
1975:4 yes
1976:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes
1993:1 yes
1995:1 yes
1995:2 yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Japan
1972:1 yes
1974:3 yes
1979:1 yes yes
1979:2 yes
1979:4 yes
1980:1 yes yes
1989:2 yes yes
1989:3 yes
1990:1 yes
1991:1 yes yes
1995:3 yes
1995:4 yes
1997:1 yes
Netherlands
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1978:3 yes yes
1978:4 yes
1980:3 yes yes
1989:3 yes
1992:3 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
New Zealand
1970:4 yes
1974:2 yes
1974:3 yes
1975:3 yes
1975:4 yes
1976:2 yes yes
1980:1 yes yes
1980:3 yes yes
1982:1 yes yes
1984:3 yes
1985:1 yes yes yes
1986:3 yes
1988:3 yes yes
1989:3 yes
Norway
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1977:4 yes yes yes
1982:3 yes
1982:4 yes yes
1986:2 yes yes
1986:3 yes yes
1986:4 yes yes
1987:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Portugal
1972:4 yes
1976:2 yes
1977:1 yes
1977:2 yes yes
1978:2 yes
1978:4 yes
1983:3 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes
Spain
1970:2 yes
1973:1 yes
1973:3 yes yes
1976:1 yes yes
1977:3 yes yes
1983:1 yes yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
1993:3 yes yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
Sweden
1970:1 yes yes yes
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes yes
1973:3 yes
1977:3 yes
1977:4 yes
1981:4 yes yes
1982:4 yes yes
1987:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes
1993:1 yes
Switzerland
1970:1 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1971:1 yes yes
1972:4 yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:3 yes yes
1978:4 yes
1979:1 yes
1981:1 yes yes
1982:2 yes
1992:3 yes
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Continuation Table A
date country
EMP index
unweighted
EMP index
weighted
third measure
U.K.
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1972:1 yes
1972:2 yes
1972:3 yes yes
1973:3 yes
1976:2 yes
1976:4 yes
1981:4 yes yes
1983:1 yes
1986:1 yes
1986:3 yes
1986:4 yes
1992:3 yes yes
1992:4 yes yes
U.S.A.
1970:2 yes yes
1970:3 yes yes
1970:4 yes yes
1971:3 yes yes yes
1973:1 yes yes
1973:2 yes
1973:3 yes
1977:2 yes
1979:3 yes yes
1980:4 yes yes
1985:4 yes
1986:1 yes
1987:1 yes
1992:3 yes yes yes
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Table B: Identication of Currency Crises and OÆcial Events
Date Events
1967 Devaluation $
Beginning of the events towards the breakdown
of Bretton Woods
Early'71 Foreign CB buy $ to prevent the $ from depreciating
May'71 German CB buys a huge amount of $, not useful
Suspended intervention
German and Dutch authorities oat their currency
August'71 US suspension of the link between $ and gold
Dec.'71 Smithsonian agreement: intention of re-instituting a
system of stable exchange rates
Æ 8% devaluation $
Æ 17% revaluation yen
Æ 4% devaluation DM
Æ bands enlarges to 2.25%
It lasts 14 months (to February73)
24 April'72 Basle Agreement: snake in the ($) tunnel: 6 EC members
(Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands) agree to halve the margin of the
Smithsonian agreement
1 May'72 Denmark, UK, Ireland join the snake
23 May'72 Norway joins the snake
23 June'72 $ and Irish punt withdraw
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
27 June'72 Denmark withdraws
June'72 $ oats
Speculation against the $ in the following months
10 Oct.'72 Denmark returns
13 Feb.'73 Italy withdraws
Early'73 Swiss franc oats against the $
$ devaluation
Yen oat against the $
French Franc oats
DM oats
19 March'73 Floating of the $ (end of Bretton Woods), the tunnel
disappeared leaving the snake as a joint oat for the
participants
Sweden becomes associated
DM revaluation, 3%, because of the depreciation of the $ that
creates tensions in the snake, but this is not enough, so in )
June'73 DM revaluation by 5.5%
Norwegian krone devaluated by 13%
Dannish krone devaluated by 6%
Finnish markka devaluated 7%
17 Sept.'73 Dutch guilder revaluation 5%
16 Nov.'73 Norwegian krone revaluation 5%
Middle'73 First oil shock ! $ begins to appreciate against DM and yen
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
19 Jan.'74 France withdraws (because of problems derived from the oil shock)
French franc, Belgium-Luxembourg franc and the two
Scandinavian currencies of Denmark and Sweden are the
weaker currencies; DM and Dutch guilder are the stronger
currencies ) Clear division in the snake
10 July'75 France returns
Nov.'75 Ramboulliet meeting: legalizes oating
76 IMF legalizes the non-system
9 Feb.'76 Peseta devaluated by 13%
15 March'76 France withdraws again (because Chirac implements scal
expansion in the autumn'75 as recession deepened)
August'76 Bundesbank intervention in favour of the smaller non-German
participants in the snake
17 Oct.'76 Frankfurt realignment:
Æ Danish krone devaluation 6%
Æ Dutch guilder devaluation 2%
Æ Belgian Franc devaluation 2%
Æ Norwegian kroner devaluation 3%
Æ Swedish kroner devaluation 3%
Second half'77 $ begins to weaken
3 July'77 Peseta is allowed to oat to a 20% depreciation
78 Kingston (Jamaica): second amendment to IMF articles of
agreement takes eect, legalizing the oat and reducing the
monetary role of gold
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
Early'78 Despite intervention of American, Germany and Japanese
authorities, $ continues to fall
Appreciation DM (7%) diÆcult to handle for the other
currencies
13 Feb.'78 Norwegian krone devaluation 8%
17 Oct.'78 DM revaluated 4%
Dutch guilder revaluated 2%
Belgian franc revaluated 2%
Nov.'78 More interventions to support the $
17 Dec.'78 Norway announces decision to withdraw
13 March'79 EMS comes into being (with the snake participants)
Belgium franc, Danish krone, DM, French franc,
Irish punt, Lux. Franc and Dutch guilder band of
2.25% and Italian lira band of 6%
July'79 UK joins EMS
Sept.'79 Bundesbank intervenes to support: $, Belgian franc
and Danish krone
24 Sept.'79 DM revaluation 2%
Danish krone devaluation 2.9%
Oct.'79 Dramatic tightening of monetary policy in US
30 Nov.'79 Dannish krone devaluated by 4.8% to restore competitiveness
(with respect to ECU)
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
From Nov'79 Fiscal expansion in Germany: interest dierential in favour
to Feb.'81 of the weaker currencies ! DM near oor of band a lot
of times, requiring substantial interventions
Feb.'81 Bundesbank tights monetary policy: sharp increase in
interest rates ! DM to the top of the band
22 March'81 Italy 6% devaluation with respect ECU
Oct.'81 DM revaluation 5.5%
French franc devaluation 3%
Dutch guilder revaluation 5.5%
Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and Ireland: technically
chosen as pivots, but the realignment implied devaluation
around 2%
22 Feb.'82 Belgium 8.5% devaluation
Denmark 3% devaluation
(with respect to ECU)
14 June'82 DM revaluation 4.25%
Guilder revaluation 4.25%
French franc devaluation 5.75%
Lira devaluation 2.75%
(with respect ECU)
2 Oct.'82 Sweden devaluation 15.9%
4 Dec.'82 Peseta is devaluated by 8%
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
21 March'83 DM revaluation 5.5%
Dutch guilder revaluation 4.25%
French franc devaluation 5.75%
Italian lira devaluation 2.75%
(with respect ECU)
1980-85 Appreciation of the $ because of tight monetary policy
21 July'85 Lira devaluation 8% with respect to DM
Sept.'85 Plaza agreement (G5: France, Germany, Japan, UK and US):
Intervention selling $ for DM and yens to stop appreciation $
85 $ starts to depreciate
86 Depreciation $
Appreciation yen
7 April'86 DM and Dutch gulder revaluation 3%
Danish krone and Belgian franc revaluation 1%
French franc devaluation 3%
(with respect ECU)
4 August'86 Irish punt devaluation 8% (with respect to ECU)
12 May'86 Norwegian krone is devalued by 10.7%
Oct.'86 Governments want to stabilize $-yen exchange rate: they do
not want the $ to depreciate further ! CBs start to
intervene buying $
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
12 Jan.'87 DM devaluation 3%
Guilder devaluation 3%
Belgian-Luxembourg franc devaluation 2%
(with respect to ECU)
Feb.'87 G5 in Paris, Louvre Accord: CBs intervene buying $
Autumn'87 $ continues to fall
Mid October a small increase in DM interest rates very
criticized, panic in US ! $ falls despite intervention
Oct.'87 French franc falls but reverts in
Nov.'87 By adjustment in interest rate dierentials with
respect Germany
Early'88 Depreciation $ ends abruptly because of intervention
July'89 Peseta joins EMS, 6% band
7 Jan.'90 Spain and Italy reduce margins to 2.25%
Italian lira devaluation 3.75%
Oct.'90 UK joins EMS (6% band)
Norway pegs its currency as it moves towards
applying for EU membership
May'91 Sweden and Finland peg their currencies as they move
towards applying for EU membership
15 Nov.'91 Finland devaluation 12.3%
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
April'92 Portugal joins EMS (6% band)
2 June'92 Tensions in the EMS because of the narrow majority against the
Maastricht treaty by Denmark
Summer'92 UK postpones ratication of the treaty
Weakness of $
July'92 Increase in German interest rate to 8.5%
8 Sept.'92 Finnish markka has to abandon its ECU peg
10-11 Setp.'92 Lira under pressure: falls below its EMS oor. Massive
interventions by Banca d'Italia and Bundesbank
14 Setp.'92 Cut on German interest rate
Italian lira devaluation 3.5%
16 Sept'92 Heavy interventions failed to lift sterling from its EMS oor
Sweden raise its marginal lending rate
Temporarily suspension of both sterling and lira from participation
Devaluation 5% of peseta
19 Nov.92 Swedish krona breaks its link
22 Nov.'92 Peseta devaluation 6% (capital controls)
Escudo devaluation 6% (follows Spain)
10 Dec.'92 Norway discontinues the peg on the ECU and its currency is
allowed to oat
30 Jan.'93 Punt devaluation 10%
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Continuation Table B
Date Events
13 May'93 Peseta devaluation 8%
Escudo devaluation 6.5%
July'93 French franc under pressure: intervention
Danish krone under pressure: intervention
29 July'93 France, Belgium and Denmark fall below their EMS oor
1 August'93 Widening of the uctuations margins to 15%
Over the rst month after the decision Danish krone,
French franc and Belgian franc use a substantial
part of the new margins
Autumn'93 Danish krone, French franc and Belgian franc recover
Jan.'95 Austria joins EMS
April-May'95 Falling French franc because Jacques Chirac's campaign
promises of more expansionary policies
Lira and Swedish krone weak
$ depreciates
May'95 Peseta devaluation 7%
Escudo devaluation 3.5%
96 French franc most of the time weak
Irish Punt strong
Autumn'96 Finnish markka and lira enter EMS
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Table C: Currency Crises and Associated Events
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Australia
1974:3
1979:1
1981:3
1985:1
1986:3
1989:2
Austria
1970:1
1971:3 US suspension link $/gold
1973:1 19 March: oating of the $, the tunnel (of the snake)
disappears; DM revaluated by 3% because depreciation
of the $ that creates tensions in the snake
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revaluated by 4%
1992:3 EMS tensions: cut on German interest rates, 14 Sept.
1993:3 EMS tensions: widening of the uctuations margins
to 15%
Belgium
1970:1
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5% (tensions derived from the
oating of the $ the previous quarter)
1976:1 (French franc withdraws)
1979:3 Sept. Bundesbank intervenes to support the Belgian
1981:1 franc Feb. Bundesbank tights monetary policy: tensions
in the snake
1981:4 Oct. DM revaluated by 5.5% and Belgian franc
devaluated by 2%
1992:3 EMS tensions: cut on German interest rates, 14 Sept
1993:2 EMS tensions
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Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Canada
1977:1
1981:2
1982:2
1992:1
1992:4
Denmark
1970:1
1971:2 May: Bundesbank buy $
1973:3 (June: Dannish krone devaluated by 6%)
1976:3 Bundesbank intervention in favour of the
smaller non-German participants in the snake
1977:2
1979:4 30 Nov: Dannish krone devaluated by 4.8%
1982:1 22 Feb: Dannish krone devaluated by 3%
1992:3 EMS tensions
1993:3 29 July: Dannish krone falls below their
EMS oor; widening of the uctuations margins
to 15%
1995:1 New EMS tensions
Finland
1970:3
1973:1 oating of the $; 19 March: DM revaluated by 3%;
1973:3 problems derived from the oil crisis
1977:2
1982:4 tensions in some EMS currencies
1991:4 15 Nov: Finnish markka devaluated by 12.3%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 8 Sept. Finnish markka has to
abandon its ECU peg
1993:1 Renewed EMS tensions
1993:3 widening of the uctuations margins to 15%
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Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
France
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:3 problems derived from the oil shock
1976:1 France withdraws from the snake; Bundesbank
interventions
1978:1 Appreciation of the DM by 7%
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revaluated by 4%
1981:4 Oct. French franc devaluated by 3%
1982:3
1983:2
1992:3 EMS tensions
Greece
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5% (tensions derived from the
oating of the $ the previous quarter)
1974:3
1980:1
1982:2 DM revaluated by 4.25%
1983:1 DM revaluated by 5.5%
1985:4
Ireland
1970:2
1972:2 May: joins the snake; June: witdraws
1973:1 oating of the $ creates tensions in the snake
1973:3 problems coming from the oil shock
1976:2
1976:4
1986:3 4 August: Irish punt devaluated by 8%
1992:3 EMS tensions
48
Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Italy
1970:2
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5%
1974:4
1976:1 tensions in the snake
1992:3 EMS tensions: 10-11 Sept. Italian lira falls below its
EMS oor. Massive interventions by Banca d'Italia
and Bundesbank; 14 Sept. Italian lira devaluated by
3.5%; 16 Sept. suspension of Italian lira from
participation
1995:1 Renewed problems in the EMS
Japan
1979:1
1979:4
1989:2
1991:1
1995:3
1997:1
Netherlands
1970:2
1973:2 DM revaluated by 5.5%
1978:3 Interventions to support the $ that translates into
ulterior revaluations of the DM
1980:3
1992:3 EMS tensions
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Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
New Zealand
1975:3
1976:2 IMF legalize the non-system
1980:1
1980:3
1982:1
1984:3
1985:1
1986:3
1988:3
Norway
1970:2
1973:1 End of Bretton Woods; DM revaluated by 3%
1973:3 DM revaluated by 5.5%; Norwegian krone
devaluated by 13%
1977:4
1982:3
1986:2
1992:3 EMS tensions (10 Dec. Norway discontinues the
on the ECU and its currency is allowed to oat
Portugal
1976:2
1977:1
1978:2
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revaluated by 4%
1982:3
1992:3 EMS tensions: 22 Nov. Porugues escudo devaluated
by 6%
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Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
Spain
1970:2
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19March: DM revaluated by 3%
1973:3 June: DM revaluated by 5.5%
1976:1 9 Feb. Spanish peseta devaluated by 13%
1977:3 July: Spanish peseta is allowed to oat to a
20% depreciation
1983:1 21 March: DM revaluated by 5.5%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. Spanish peseta devaluated
by 5%; 22 Nov. new devaluation by 6%
1993:3 (13 May: Spanish peseta devaluated by 8%)
Sweden
1970:1
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19 March: DM revaluated by 3% and Sweden becomes
associated (of the snake)
1977:3
1981:4 Oct. DM revaluated by 5.5%
1982:4 2 Oct. Sweden devaluated by 15.9%
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. Sweden raise its marginal
lending rate; 19 Nov. Swedish krone breaks its link
Switzerland
1970:1
1970:3
1971:1
1972:4 Early 73: Swish franc oats against the $
1973:3
1978:4 17 Oct. DM revaluated by 4%; interventions to support the $
1981:1 Bundesbank tights monetary policy
1982:2 14 June: DM revaluated by 4.25%
1992:3 EMS tensions
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Continuation Table C
Beginning of the
Currency Crisis Associated Event (if applicable)
U.K.
1970:2
1972:2 1 May: UK joins snake
23 June: UK withdraws
1973:3
1976:2
1976:4
1981:4 Oct. DM revaluated by 5.5%
(UK joined EMS in July'79)
1983:1 21 March: DM revaluated by 5.5%
1986:1
1986:3 Depreciation $
1992:3 EMS tensions: 16 Sept. heavy interventions fail to lift sterling
from its EMS oor. Temporarily suspension of the sterling
participation
U.S.A.
1970:2
1971:3 August: US suspension of the link $/gold
1973:1 March: end of Bretton Woods;
19 March: DM revaluated by 3% and Sweden becomes
associated (of the snake)
1979:3 Sept. Bundesbank intervenes to support the $
1980:4
1985:4 Starts depreciation of the $ (after a period of appreciation)
1987:1 Feb. Louvre Accord: G5 intervens buying $
1992:3 weakness of the $
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Table D: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Estimates Std. error Expected sign
Independent Variables
Growth -0.07 0.08 -
Ination 0.10 0.08 +
Unemployment 0.01 0.02 +
Export Growth -0.04

0.02 -
Import Growth 0.03

0.02 +
Openness -0.01

0.01 -
REER 0.02

0.01 +
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05

0.03 -
Claims on Government/GDP 0.01

0.01 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.07

0.03 +
FDI/GDP -0.01 0.12 -
*
,
**
and
***
indicates signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectevely.
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Table E: Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameters Estimates Std. error Expected sign
Independent Variables
Growth -0.07 0.08 -
Ination 0.80 0.08 +
Unemployment 0.01 0.02 +
Export Growth -0.04

0.02 -
Import Growth 0.03

0.01 +
Openness -0.01

0.01 -
REER (deviation from trend) -0.08

0.03 -
Deposits/GDP (rate of growth) -0.05

0.03 -
Domestic Credit/GDP -0.002 0.005 +
Portfolio Investment/GDP 0.06

0.03 +
FDI/GDP 0.002 0.13 -
*
,
**
and
***
indicates signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectevely.
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